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“BEST PRACTICES”:  WHAT’S THE POINT?
IRA P. ROBBINS*
INTRODUCTION
In Best Practices on “Best Practices”:  Legal Education and Be-
yond,1 I formulated a definition of “best practices” where one had not
clearly existed before. I proposed that, properly understood, best
practices means “those actions that surpass all others in pursuit of a
goal or purpose according to some objectively measurable standard.”2
I then applied this definition to the book, Best Practices for Legal Ed-
ucation,3 and concluded that “[t]he concept of best practices is simply
incompatible with legal education.”4
I am grateful that Professor Stuckey, the book’s principal author,
has taken the time to respond to my article.5 I had expected to begin
this reply with a summary of our points of agreement and disagree-
ment and proceed accordingly (a best practice for replying to a cri-
tique of one’s work?). Once I read his response, however, I realized
that the former were few and the latter were numerous.
Professor Stuckey and I agree that legal education can be more
effective than it currently is and that reform efforts ought to be en-
couraged. From there we part company in significant ways. Indeed, he
commences his criticism by writing, “Our debate is about the title to
the book.”6 If this were the extent of his misuse of the term “best
practices,” I would be, well, less displeased. But it is not. One only has
to look at his nine chapter titles to realize that the problem lies much
deeper.7 Moreover, not only does Professor Stuckey employ the term
* Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, American University,
Washington College of Law; A.B. University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Harvard University.
Copyright 2009 by Ira P. Robbins. All rights reserved.
1 Ira P. Robbins, Best Practices on “Best Practices”:  Legal Education and Beyond, 16
CLINICAL L. REV. 269 (2009).
2 Id. at text accompanying note 144 (emphasis removed).
3 ROY STUCKEY AND OTHERS, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007) [here-
inafter BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION].
4 Robbins, supra note 1, at text following note 48.
5 See Roy Stuckey, “Best Practices” or Not, It is Time to Re-think Legal Education, 16
CLINICAL L. REV. 307 (2009).
6 Id. at text preceding note 3.
7 The chapter titles are:  “Reasons for Developing a Statement of Best Practices”;
“Best Practices for Setting Goals of the Program of Instruction”; “Best Practices for Or-
ganizing the Program of Instruction”; “Best Practices for Delivering Instruction, Gener-
ally”; “Best Practices for Experiential Courses”; “Best Practices for Non-experiential
Teaching Methods”; “Best Practices for Assessing Student Learning”; “Best Practices for
321
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1505627
\\server05\productn\N\NYC\16-1\NYC104.txt unknown Seq: 2 27-OCT-09 7:47
322 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:321
many dozens of times in many contexts, but he also makes sweeping
assertions that quickly belie his summary of our debate. He writes, for
example, that “[e]vidence of [a school’s commitment to doing the best
job it can to prepare its graduates to practice law effectively and
responsibly] could be the extent to which a school employs best prac-
tices for legal education, as described in this document or elsewhere.”8
Obviously our disagreement is hardly a matter of book title alone.
Professor Stuckey rejects all aspects of my best-practices template, as
well as the dictionary definitions of both “best” and “practice.”
With all due respect, I submit that Professor Stuckey misses the
point. In fact, he misses so many points that I think it is important to
join the issues directly and without any ambiguity. Simply put, from
beginning to end—literally, from the title of his article to his conclud-
ing sentence—his response is replete with misunderstanding about
best practices, both the concept and its application.
I. RESPONSE TO CRITICISMS
A. Definition of “Best Practices”
Professor Stuckey begins his response article by questioning my
reasons for formulating a definition of “best practices”: “Professor
Robbins does not explain why he chose to create his own definition of
‘best practices’ rather than to use one of the various pre-existing defi-
nitions he discusses in the article.”9 I did not discuss various pre-ex-
isting definitions, because there were no such definitions to discuss.
Instead, I surveyed three models (the industrial model, the successful-
practices model, and the qualitative-best-practices model) in which
the concept of best practices had been employed.10 However impor-
tant they may be, these models were no more than applications of
unstated definitions. While I described the steps taken to achieve best
practices within each model, I concluded this section of my article by
stating: “There are pros and cons associated with any model of best
practices . . . . Without certain attributes, however, some practices do
Assessing Institutional Effectiveness”; and “Components of a ‘Model’ Best Practices Cur-
riculum.” See BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 3, at i.
8 Id. at 40. See also Robbins, supra note 1, at notes 39-43 and accompanying text
(describing some contexts in which Best Practices for Legal Education uses the term). Pro-
fessor Stuckey appears to contradict this assertion elsewhere in the book. See BEST PRAC-
TICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 4 (“[We will never] be able to reach
universal agreement about the specific knowledge, skills, and values that law schools
should teach if for no other reason than the vastly diverse practice settings in which our
graduates work.”).
9 Stuckey, supra note 5, at note 7.
10 See Robbins, supra note 1, Part II.B.
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not merit the appellation ‘best.’ ”11 In the subsequent section, “Worst
Practices on Best Practices,” I discussed the failures of many attempts
to achieve best practices and identified the reasons for those failures:
no objective goals, no objective standards, and no methodology.12
With this background, I sought to articulate those attributes that are
the sine qua non of best practices. Building on the dictionary defini-
tions of “best” and “practice,”13 I incorporated the requisite attributes
and formulated the following definition: “those actions that surpass all
others in pursuit of a goal or purpose according to some objectively
measurable standard.”14 Professor Stuckey rejects my definition as a
mere “cobb[ling] together [of] dictionary definitions of ‘best’ and
‘practices’ . . . .”15 But, as the author of Best Practices for Legal Educa-
tion, he does not propose an alternative definition for his key term,
either in the book or in his response article.
B. Application of the Definition
More significant than his rejection of my definition, Professor
Stuckey dismisses my application of the three prongs of my template
to Best Practices for Legal Education: “All accredited law schools
share common goals, there is only one superior method to achieve law
schools’ objectives, and law schools can evaluate the quality of their
programs of instruction according to some standard and could objec-
tively verify their success with different and better metrics.”16 I will
address each of these points in turn.
1. No Common Goal
Stating that all accredited law schools share common goals,17 Pro-
fessor Stuckey writes:
Professor Robbins contends that Best Practices for Legal Edu-
cation fails to meet his first criterion because “[g]oals for legal edu-
cation vary among, and even within, institutions.” Certainly, most
law schools have multiple missions and these vary from institution
to institution. As a consequence, the curriculums of law schools
should have different emphases. They should not look exactly
alike.18
No quarrel from me. But if law schools’ missions, goals, or emphases
11 Id. at text following note 107.
12 See id. Part III.
13 See id. at notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
14 See id. at note 144 and accompanying text (emphasis removed).
15 See Stuckey, supra note 5, at note 7 and accompanying text.
16 Id. at paragraph following note 8.
17 Id.
18 Id. at paragraph containing note 9 (footnotes omitted).
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are different, how can we fairly and intelligently compare the extent
to which one or another school uses best practices?
Professor Stuckey continues:
One of the things that law teachers should be able to agree
about is the overall purpose of a legal education. At its core, legal
education is a professional education, and part of the mission of
every law school is to prepare its students to enter the legal profes-
sion. It is why law schools exist.19
Again, I do not necessarily disagree that part of the mission of every
law school is to prepare its students to enter the legal profession. But
what does preparation to enter the legal profession mean? I wrote
that, “[w]ithout clearly stated goals or missions, there is no way that a
best practice can lead to success,”20 and that with vague generalities,
“it is impossible to achieve a goal in a manner surpassing all others.”21
Yet Professor Stuckey responds only with such generalities. He cites,
for example, American Bar Association (ABA) requirements that all
accredited law schools “maintain an educational program that
prepares its students for admission to the bar and effective and respon-
sible participation in the legal profession,”22 and “provide ‘substantial
instruction’ in a range of subject areas.”23 Professor Stuckey also re-
fers to the Carnegie Report’s similarly vague statements that “the for-
mation of competent and committed professionals deserves and needs
to be the common, unifying purpose,”24 and that “the common task of
all professional education . . . is ‘preparing students for the complex
demands of professional work—to think, to perform, and to conduct
themselves like professionals.’ ”25
Absent from this argument are the precision and objectivity nec-
essary to a determination of what is best. Professor Stuckey states:
Professor Robbins argues that “[o]nly those schools that teach
students to perform a given skill or task in the best possible manner
would reflect best practices in legal education.” This is incorrect. It
is not the function of law schools to develop professional expertise
fully, no more than it is to teach all the law that students will need
19 Id. at paragraph following note 11.
20 Robbins, supra note 1, at note 112 and accompanying text.
21 Id. at note 194 and accompanying text.
22 See Stuckey, supra note 5, at note 12 and accompanying text (Professor Stuckey’s
emphasis; citation omitted) (quoting ABA Standard 301(a)).
23 Id. at note 13 (citation omitted).
24 See id. at note 15 and accompanying text (citation omitted).
25 Id. at note 16 and accompanying text (citation omitted). For another example of a
vague and immeasurable assertion of shared goals, see id. at note 21 and accompanying
text (“[I]n Best Practices for Legal Education, we encourage law schools to ‘design and
offer programs of instruction that aim to take novice learners and equip them to develop
into expert problem-solvers.’ ”) (citation omitted).
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to know to practice law effectively.26
With this non sequitur, Professor Stuckey completely misses the point
about best practices. I never claimed that the function of law schools is
to develop professional expertise fully. That clearly does not follow
from the sentence he quotes. More important, even if I had made such
a claim, how can Professor Stuckey argue persuasively that best
doesn’t mean best? What definition is he using?27 He never says, ei-
ther in Best Practices for Legal Education or in his response article.
Rather, he writes:
In Best Practices for Legal Education we recommend specific
outcomes that law schools should seek to achieve. We include a
statement of twelve core general characteristics and abilities that
entry level lawyers should have on day one in practice. We also pro-
vide a definition of professional competence, and we provide a
more detailed description of the knowledge, skills, and values of ef-
fective, responsible lawyers. I think it is difficult to argue that any of
the outcomes we propose should not be among every law school’s
objectives, but we invite and encourage debate about this. If it turns
out that it is impossible for law schools to achieve these outcomes in
three years, then law teachers need to make this clear to bar admis-
sions authorities and begin a dialogue to determine exactly what
responsibility law schools bear for preparing students to practice
law.28
In what scheme of best practices does one invite and encourage de-
bate and begin a dialogue after the “best practices” have been pro-
nounced and published? The debate and dialogue should precede the
assertion of best practices to determine whether best practices exist in
a given area.29
2. No One Way to Reach the Common Goal
Even if there were a specific agreed-upon goal for legal educa-
tion, I argued that, for a practice to be considered best, there must be
only one way to achieve that goal that is clearly superior to all
others.30 I stated that, in part because “law schools are rife with disa-
greement about methodology,”31 “this precondition is . . . absent from
26 Id. at paragraph containing note 18 (citation omitted).
27 And in what way does it help his argument to quote the statement from the Carnegie
Report that students “must become ‘metacognitive’ about their own learning”? See id. at
note 19 and accompanying text.
28 See id. at paragraph containing notes 24-26 (footnotes omitted).
29 I am not now arguing against any of the ABA standards or the recommendations
contained in the Carnegie Report or Best Practices in Legal Education. Rather, I challenge
whether any of these can properly be considered best practices.
30 See Robbins, supra note 1, at text following note 194.
31 Id. at paragraph containing note 200.
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Best Practices for Legal Education; indeed, it may be unattainable,
given the nature of legal education in general.”32
Not surprisingly, Professor Stuckey disagrees. He writes: “Best
Practices for Legal Education describes a clearly superior way to
achieve the shared educational goals of law schools[.]”33 He then
quotes five recommendations from the book34 and instantly concludes
in res ipsa loquitur fashion, “[t]his is how law schools can achieve their
common educational objectives.”35 Such an empty statement is un-
helpful to the debate. Why do these five recommendations comprise
the “clearly superior” way to accomplish the shared goals of law
schools? What methodology was used to determine their superiority?
How should institutions and teachers develop a clear understanding of
precisely what they want students to learn? How should the curricu-
lum be organized to deliver instruction in professional knowledge,
skills, and values in a congruent, progressive, and integrative manner?
How should teachers select teaching methods that will achieve their
educational objectives as effectively and efficiently as possible? How
should teachers go about choosing teaching methods as skillfully as
possible? And, perhaps most important for present purposes, how
should teachers and institutions evaluate the degree to which they are
succeeding?
Unfortunately, Professor Stuckey does not answer any of these
questions. He only adds, apparently gratuitously, “[u]nless Professor
Robbins can propose an equally superior way to achieve the educa-
tional objectives outlined above, he is incorrect in contending that
Best Practices for Legal Education fails to meet his second crite-
rion.”36 Leaving aside that I had hoped our disagreement would not
become personal,37 I submit that Professor Stuckey misses the point
yet again. It is not that Professor Stuckey cannot devise a way to
achieve clearly superior educational objectives; it is that no one can. If
he believes that his recommendations are clearly superior to all
32 Id. at paragraph containing note 195.
33 Stuckey, supra note 5, at sentence preceding note 28.
34 See id. at notes 28-32 and accompanying text:
(1) educational institutions and individual teachers should have a clear understand-
ing of what they want students to learn; (2) the curriculum should be organized to
deliver instruction in professional knowledge, skills, and values in a congruent, pro-
gressive, and integrative manner; (3) teachers should select teaching methods that
will achieve their educational objectives as effectively and efficiently as possible; (4)
teachers should employ chosen teaching methods as skillfully as possible; and (5)
teachers and institutions should evaluate the degree to which they are succeeding.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
35 Id. at text following note 32.
36 Id.
37 See also infra at text following note 63 (emphasizing the impersonal nature of this
debate).
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others, he should share his precise reasons for reaching such a mo-
mentous conclusion.
3. Results of Best Practices Are Not Objectively Verifiable
I stated in my article that “legal education cannot be endowed
with a set of best practices because those practices cannot be objec-
tively verified in relation to all other current or previous practices in
the field.”38 I added, “[t]his final precondition is arguably the most
important of the [criteria for best practices] because of the very nature
of best qua superior to all others.”39 Strangely, Professor Stuckey re-
sponds by ignoring my definition of best practices and looking only to
the dictionary definition of “best” that I had cited and supplemented:
The “objectively verifiable” requirement is not in the definitions
from which Professor Robbins derived his criteria. The definition of
“best” chosen by Professor Robbins only requires that the superior-
ity of the practice be demonstrated “according to some standard.”
Therefore, even under Professor Robbins’ definition, a practice
does not have to be “objectively verifiable” in relation to all current
or previous practices in order to qualify as a “best practice.”40
Even a cursory reading of my article shows that, in the sentence im-
mediately following my reference to the dictionary definitions of
“best” and “practice,” I formulated a working definition of “best prac-
tices”:  “[T]he term should be defined as those actions that surpass all
others in pursuit of a goal or purpose according to some objectively
measurable standard. This definition can serve as the basis for a tem-
plate to determine whether a purported best practice is in fact a best
practice.”41 Why Professor Stuckey chooses to ignore this definition
and rely on the dictionary definition of “best”—particularly after he
has already chastised me for “cobb[ling] together dictionary defini-
tions of ‘best’ and ‘practices’ ”42—baffles me.43
38 Robbins, supra note 1, at text following note 213.
39 Id.
40 Stuckey, supra note 5, at text accompanying note 34 (Professor Stuckey’s emphasis;
other emphasis removed; footnote omitted).
41 Robbins, supra note 1, at text following note 144 (footnote omitted).
42 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
43 Further discussing my definition, Professor Stuckey writes:
One of the ironies of Professor Robbins’ definition is that (by his own admission) it
would disqualify most current usage of the term “best practices.” While he may pre-
fer that the term be used differently, when one’s definition is at odds with almost all
current usage the problem may be the proposed definition, not the term.
Stuckey, supra note 5, at note 8. If the usage of a term (or a law, for that matter) is incor-
rect, it should be modified or rejected. That’s the way knowledge and understanding are
advanced. Professor Stuckey refers to current usage. How does a usage become current?
Doesn’t the use of that word allow for change over time? Suffice it to say that I am content
to have my proposed definition and its application tested in the marketplace of ideas by
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Moreover, Professor Stuckey’s reliance on “some standard” is too
amorphous to provide any assurance of meaningful comparison. He
compounds this indefiniteness when he articulates his so-called stan-
dard:  “One type of standard commonly used as an evaluation tool is
opinion. If a law school wants to evaluate the quality of its educational
program, it can seek the opinions of people who have relevant infor-
mation about it.”44 To determine best practices, he says, we should ask
students for their opinions of teachers and courses. We should also ask
them about their “overall educational experiences” after each semes-
ter and once they have been in practice.45 In addition to consulting
students, we should seek the opinions of employers, ABA site-inspec-
tion teams, and, if necessary, independent outside evaluators.46 While
I do not question the merit of consulting students, graduates, employ-
ers, outside faculty and administrators, and others for various pur-
poses, I do question the relevance of their subjective opinions when it
comes to determining and evaluating best practices. Opinion is of little
value when assessing what is “best.”47 Without objectivity, such a stan-
dard is no standard at all.48
Returning to my criterion of objective verifiability, Professor
Stuckey writes:
Let us now consider how one might objectively verify the qual-
ity of an educational program. Professor Robbins does not believe it
is possible “because the nature of measuring quality among law
schools and within legal education is inherently subjective and,
therefore, open to extreme (and perhaps desirable) disagreement.”
Yet, Professor Robbins explains earlier in his article that one way
(the “best” way?) to develop a system for objective verification is to
look to the process of benchmarking. Professor Robbins does not
seem to consider the possibility of establishing benchmarks of edu-
cational quality for law schools.49
Professor Stuckey misses the point here in two critical ways. First,
benchmarking is neither a definition of best practices nor a substitute
impartial observers who may agree that something other than the best should not be
equated with “best.”
44 Id. at second paragraph after note 34 (emphasis added).
45 See id. at third paragraph after note 34.
46 See id. at paragraphs containing and following note 35.
47 See Robbins, supra note 1, at text accompanying note 1 (presenting Jerry Seinfeld’s
observations on “the best”).
48 I cannot help but wonder about the extent to which Professor Stuckey is influenced
by the highly subjective “law porn” that inundates law faculty mailboxes in an effort to
affect the U.S. News & World Report annual rankings of best law schools. See id. at notes
215-20 and accompanying text (discussing law porn and the value of the U.S. News
rankings).
49 Stuckey, supra note 5, at paragraph containing notes 36 & 37 (footnotes omitted).
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for it. It is only a part of the process of determining best practices.50 I
wrote: “As used in the field of professional instruction, a best practice
appears to be a starting point, an innovative idea that may lead to a
set goal, but not necessarily the means to achieving that goal.”51 Mea-
surement is still key to determining relative success.52
The second way in which Professor Stuckey misses the point
about benchmarking is through the example he discusses. He writes
that
benchmarks are being used today to measure the quality of legal
education in England, Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland. The
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) was cre-
ated in 1997 to “provide an integrated quality assurance service for
UK higher education[ ]” . . . [and] to define clear and explicit stan-
dards including frameworks for higher education . . . . The QAA
also conducts audits to determine if schools are providing education
of an acceptable quality and at an appropriate academic standard.53
What is “acceptable” or “appropriate” should not be equated with
what is “best.” In the QAA context, acceptability and appropriateness
do not have to be evaluated by comparison and can be determined
from opinions. Why? Because the Quality Assurance Agency sought
to identify not best practices, but only baselines. Professor Stuckey
seems to recognize as much when he writes: “[T]he QAA developed
benchmark standards for law schools . . . . These are minimum stan-
dards that apply to all law schools. Each school is free to set higher
benchmarks for its students.”54 So to support his argument for recog-
nition of best practices in legal education, Professor Stuckey turns the
concept on its head by relying on an approach that seeks to achieve
lowest common denominators.
Professor Stuckey says that he would endorse “[t]he development
of benchmarks for legal education in the United States.”55 If under-
stood as minimum standards, so would I. Indeed, in many ways I think
this is actually the way Professor Stuckey understands best practices.
50 I actually like the idea of benchmarking. In fact, I described the concept of
benchmarking at length, see Robbins, supra note 1, Part II.A., and described three styles of
benchmarking (competitive, cooperative, and collaborative). See id. at notes 66-70 and ac-
companying text.
51 See id. at text following note 80.
52 See id. at note 50 and accompanying text (noting the importance of continuous mea-
surement for benchmarking); see also id. at paragraph containing note 228 (“Successful
benchmarking depends on having an objectively verifiable, agreed-upon industry
standard.”).
53 Stuckey, supra note 5, at paragraph containing notes 38-40 (emphasis added; foot-
notes omitted).
54 Id. at paragraph containing note 41 (emphasis added).
55 Id. at paragraph following note 41.
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He writes, for example:
All law teachers should be able to articulate clearly what their law
schools do and what they seek to accomplish in each of their class-
rooms. As we explain in Best Practices for Legal Education, setting
clear educational objectives has to be the first step in reforming le-
gal education. Only when law teachers know what they are trying to
accomplish can they begin to consider how to measure their
success.56
I do not disagree. In fact, he appears here to come close to acknowl-
edging some of the ideas I expressed in my article—for example, that
benchmarking is a step in the process, that benchmarking does not in
itself constitute best practices, that measurement is essential, and that
we are not at the point at which we can adequately measure success.
But he never quite gets there.
II. ON DISTRACTION AND THE PRECISION OF LANGUAGE
Professor Stuckey says that our disagreement about best practices
is a distraction and a diversion:
I do not think it is important whether either of us is right or
wrong about the appropriate use of the term “best practices.” De-
bating the appropriateness of the title of the book and whether law
teachers should be discussing “better” practices instead of “best”
practices is distracting. It diverts our time and attention from work-
ing to improve legal education.57
This is an unfortunate characterization of the argument, for it leads
me to believe that he misses another major point—namely, how can
one honestly and reasonably work to improve legal education without
evaluating whether one practice is better than another? And how can
one perform such an evaluation without precise language and objec-
tive analysis?
Professor Stuckey perpetuates this imprecision by flippantly of-
fering alternative book titles, without appreciating the nuances of dif-
ference.58 The title of his response article is itself revealing: “ ‘Best
Practices’ or Not, It is Time to Re-think Legal Education.” These are
two entirely different enterprises. One—rethinking—requires the de-
56 Id. at text following note 44. See also id. at final paragraph (“Best Practices for Legal
Education does not answer every question or explain how to resolve all of the issues that
legal educators should be trying to address. It simply provides some basic information
about learning theory and teaching methods that might assist law teachers who want to
improve the quality of legal education at their institutions or just in their courses.”) (em-
phasis added).
57 Id. at paragraph containing notes 5 & 6.
58 See supra at notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Stuckey’s asser-
tion that “[o]ur debate is about the title to the book”).
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velopment of competing thoughts. The other—best practices—re-
quires subjecting those thoughts to the rigors of objective analysis.
The first is a precondition to the second. To rethink without objective
analysis may be productive and lead to beneficial reforms (short of
accurate comparative assessment). However, only to rethink and call
it best practices is inaccurate, ill-considered, and slipshod. Even Pro-
fessor Stuckey says that using the term “best practices” for his project
and book title “was perhaps a bit brazen or presumptuous.”59 Yet he
continues to pursue his misunderstanding:
If Professor Robbins had raised his objections before the book was
published, he might have persuaded us to call the book “successful
practices,” “better practices,” or “good practices.” I could have
been satisfied with any of those. In hindsight, I think the most ap-
propriate title would have been, “Principles of Effective Educa-
tional Practices for Law Schools and Law Teachers.” That title
would probably not have fit on the binder, however. It is too late
now, of course, to change the title of the book . . . .60
While it is too late to change the title of the book, it is not too late to
recognize its limitations. After all, we are not talking about rocket
science or brain surgery here.61 Did the group of authors need an out-
sider to debunk the obvious misuse of its key term? Equally impor-
tant, now that I have raised objections, I am nonplussed that in his
concluding sentence Professor Stuckey expresses confidence in his ad-
mittedly brazen or presumptuous use of the term and conveys opti-
mism that “the next version of the book can be titled ‘Best Practices
in Legal Education’ rather than ‘Best Practices for Legal Educa-
tion.’ ”62 He just does not seem to get the point—or be willing to
recognize—that, for present purposes, these titles are fungible.
Professor Stuckey writes:
Professor Robbins quarrels with the statement in Best Practices
for Legal Education that “most law schools do not employ the best
practices for educating lawyers.” “[F]or Professor Stuckey to write
that ‘most law schools do not employ the best practices for educat-
ing lawyers’ is to presume knowledge that he does not—and one
cannot—have.” Without going into any personal qualifications I
might have to support that statement, I would simply point out that
this statement first appeared in an early draft of the book and re-
mained there for years. Every draft was posted on-line, and many
59 See Stuckey, supra note 5, at sentence following note 45. See also Robbins, supra
note 1, at text following note 229 (describing the improper use of best practices as “a
jactation of superlative excellence that simply does not exist”).
60 See Stuckey, supra note 5, at paragraph containing note 45.
61 And if we were, would good practices be good enough? Or would we want best
practices?
62 See Stuckey, supra note 5, at final sentence.
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people made suggestions for improving the book. No one ever chal-
lenged the accuracy of the statement. Neither does Professor Rob-
bins, for that matter.63
This debate is decidedly not personal. It has nothing to do with
Professor Stuckey’s (or his contributors’) qualifications. It has to do
with a definition and its application. Nevertheless, when he writes that
“[n]o one ever challenged the accuracy of the statement,” he is bla-
tantly wrong. I did challenge it—in the very sentence of mine that he
quotes. Without attention to those actions that surpass all others in
pursuit of a goal or purpose according to some objectively measurable
standard, it is meaningless to discuss “best practices” for educating
lawyers.
There is always room for intelligent discussion of reform of edu-
cational goals and practices.64 Thus, if he had titled the book “A Vi-
sion and a Road Map for Improving Legal Education,”65 or
“Principles of Effective Educational Practices for Law Schools and
Law Teachers,” or “Recommended Minimum Standards for Legal Ed-
ucation,” and referred throughout the book not to “best practices,”
but to “suggestions for reform” or some equivalent phrase, I would
have no objection.66 However, I draw the line at the misuse of the
concept of best practices to convey a false sense of security, an unsub-
stantiated sense of acceptance or endorsement. The central tenet of
Professor Stuckey’s article is that “best” can mean something other
than best and that the difference really does not matter.67
63 Id. at paragraph containing notes 48 & 49 (footnotes omitted).
64 Professor Stuckey writes that I do not truly believe this. Without citation to any
portion(s) of my article, he states:
One of the most disheartening aspects of Professor Robbins’ article is its lack of faith
that law schools can or even should change. Professor Robbins argues that there are
lots of goals and no way to verify progress, which leads inevitably to inaction. In this
way Professor Robbins falls into a perennial trap: he lets the perfect (or the “best”)
be the enemy of the good.
Id. at full paragraph preceding note 42. Unfortunately he misses the point (again). I have
not argued here or elsewhere that law schools cannot or should not change. Nor have I
argued that there is no way to verify progress. Rather, I have maintained that there is no
way to identify what is best in legal education. Professor Stuckey’s conclusion about inac-
tion, therefore, stems from his own misunderstanding of the difference between successful
reforms and best practices. Indeed, if we were to shift our attention from identifying best
practices to focusing on approaches that work in practice, there might actually be more
time to think about positive reforms. To fixate on my faith in reform, especially incorrectly,
is hardly productive.
65 See Robbins, supra note 1, at note 30 and accompanying text (discussing the words
“A Vision and A Road Map” in reference to Best Practices for Legal Education).
66 In fact, I would not have seen the need to write my article—or I would have chosen
another context in which to apply my definition.
67 See Stuckey, supra note 5, Part IV (first paragraph) (“So, who is right? Was it im-
proper usage to include “best practices” in the title of our book? Should we refrain from
using the term “best practices’ in discussing educational reform? I do not think so, but I
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CONCLUSION
I respectfully request that the reader refer to the concluding sec-
tion of my main article, for nothing in Professor Stuckey’s response
has changed either my thinking or anything I wrote there. I have said
many times in this article that Professor Stuckey misses the point. For
example, he says that our debate is merely about a book title. He re-
jects my definition of “best practices,” but does not formulate another
one. He does not (or is unwilling to) recognize where the subjective
ends and the objective begins—and why the difference is critical to
the conception of what is “best.” He says that our debate is a distrac-
tion from reform in legal education.
Rather than a distraction, when properly understood and applied
the concept of best practices helps us to analyze, to evaluate, and to
make recommendations fairly and with confidence in the use of
superlatives. When improperly understood and applied, as in Best
Practices for Legal Education and Professor Stuckey’s response arti-
cle, we are left to wallow in a quagmire of invalidly and unreliably
tested subjective opinions. While perhaps important for consideration
of what may be good and worth trying (in legal education or else-
where), these opinions—by definition—cannot identify for us what is
best. That’s the point.
also do not think it really matters to many people.”).
